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Abstract
Keywords: overlapping generations, retirement age, social security reform
In this study, we investigate the e¤ects of social security reform in 2008
on aggregate variables.We focus only on to the change in retirement age of
this reform by leaving the other structural and administrative changes aside.
Our main results are as follows: (i) social security reform has a great positive
e¤ect on capital accumulation; (ii) aggregate labor supply in e¢ ciency units
increases while mean labor hours remain relatively costant; (ii) social security
tax rate to balance the budget of social security system decreases dramatically.
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2008 YILINDA YAPILAN SOSYAL GÜVENL·IK REFORMUNUN
ETK·ILER·I
Alparslan Tuncay
Economi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Remzi Kaygusuz
Özet
Anahtar Kelimeler: emeklilik yas¸¬, kesi¸sen nesiller, sosyal güvenlik re-
formu
Bu çal¬¸smada, 2008 y¬l¬nda yap¬lan sosyal güvenlik reformunun toplam
de¼gerler üzerindeki etkilerini inceledik. Sosyal güvenlik reformunun getirdi¼gi
idari ve di¼ger yap¬sal de¼gi¸siklikleri bir kenara b¬rakarak, sadece bu reformun
emeklilik yas¸¬ile ilgili getirdi¼gi de¼gi¸sikli¼gin etkilerini göz önüne ald¬k. Temel
sonuçlar¬m¬z s¸unlard¬r: (i) sosyal sigortalar reformu sermaye birikimi üzerinde
önemli miktarda pozitif etki meydana getirmektedir; (ii) bireylerin çal¬¸smaya
ay¬rd¬¼g¬ ortalama vakitte belirgin bir de¼gi¸siklik olmazken, verimlilik birimi
cinsinden toplam i¸sgücü arz¬artmaktad¬r; (iii) sosyal sigortalar bütçesini den-
geleyen i¸sgücü üzerinden al¬nan sosyal güvenlik vergi oran¬nda önemli bir düs¸üs¸
meydana gelmektedir.
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1 Introduction
Issues surrounding the social security system have invoked public interest
with the shift regarding retirement policy in 1993. With that change, the for-
mer retirement age 60 for men and 55 for women was abolished and replaced
with a requirement of 25 years of contribution for men and 20 years of contri-
bution for women to receive retirement benets. For example, a woman, who
starts to work at 20 years old, can get retirement benets when she reaches
age 40. By taking into consideration that average life expectancy is about 74
years in 2008 in Turkey according to Turkstat estimates, this change means
that an individual can get retirement benets for more than 30 years on av-
erage in return for their participation to labor force for about 23 years on
average. However, the situation for developed countries is the exact opposite,
such as people in the United States have a life expectancy of 78 years in 2008
according to OECD (2011) estimates but individuals are eligible to retirement
at age 65. This shift in retirement policy in 1993 has brought about detrimen-
tal perterbations in social security system budget within a few years and the
necessity of reform in social security system seemed as inevitable. Eventually
in 2008, the government carried out a drastic reform on social security system
and the retirement age was established as 65 to restore the actuarial balance
of the social security.
The reform of social security system in 2008 includes change in administra-
tive structure of social security institutions, introduction of universal health
care and changes in the parameters of pension schemes in addition to the
change in retirement age. In this paper, we focus only on to the change in
retirement age of this social security reform. We take the policy, which had
been enacted in 1993 and requires 25 years of contribution for men and 20
years of contribution for women, as the benchmark economy and calibrate the
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model parameters according to this policy. Then, we introduce the change in
retirement age of the reform in 2008 to the model and compute the changes
on aggregate variables with respect to the benchmark economy. Then, we
evaluate and discuss the aggregate e¤ects of this reform. For ease of reference,
we prefer to use alternative policy in stead of the change in retirement age in
2008 and bencmark policy rather than the shift in retirement policy in 1993.
We develop an applied general equilibrium model, consists of overlapping
generations 81-period lived individuals facing mortality risk. At any point in
time, there is a continuum of individuals. Private credit markets are closed
by assumption. During their working years, individuals face stochastic pro-
ductivity shocks and they can supply labor elastically up to the mandatory
retirement age. They can receive retirement benets as they reach the early
retirement age, which is the earliest age that an agent can retire. Once they
get retired, they cannot get back to work in the rest of their life. Individuals in
our economy save through private asset holdings in order to provide for old-age
consumption and to insure against future income uctuations. After retire-
ment, individuals rely on private savings and social security benets which is
a function of their past labor earnings. Social security benets are nanced
through a payroll tax on labor. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect
to their age, asset holdings, employment status, productivity shock and past
labor earnings. With open economy assumption, factor prices are completely
determined by market forces. We specify the optimization problem of the in-
dividuals as a nite-state, nite-horizon, dynamic program and use numerical
methods to compute equillibria under former policy as a benchmark economy
and latter policy as an alternative economy.
Several ndings has emerged from this study. First, increase in early retire-
ment age has a great e¤ect on capital accumulation, output, labor supply and
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saving rates. As pointed out in the text, this is a consequence of the signicant
decrease in agents future earnings. Agents are bereft of signicant amount
of their future income, therefore they need to increase their savings in order
to support future consumption. From another point of view, individuals tend
to accumulate assets when they supply labor and they tend to spend their
savings after they get retired. Social security system makes a transfer from
workers to retirees and so it tends to decrease savings by shifting resources
from potentially high savers to retirees who save less. With the increase in
retirement age, the amount of transfers from high savers to less savers reduces
dramatically. Hence, the role that social security system plays in the economy,
which has a negative e¤ect on individualssavings and labor supply, dimin-
ishes. Therefore, savings and labor supply increases at a considerable amount.
Second, the decrease in social security tax rate, to balance the budget of social
security, is of considerable magnitude. The reasons behind this nding are
great decrease in the sum of whole retirement benets and increase in labor
supply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
tures. Section 3 describes the model in detail. Section 4 contains the calibra-
tion process. Section 5 presents the results from our bencmark and alternative
economy and their comparison. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds upon a series of papers that grow out of discrete-time
overlapping generations models rst introduced by Auerbach and Kotliko¤
(1987). Hubbard and Judd (1987) extend Aeurbach and Kotliko¤ framework
by introducing borrowing restrictions and lifetime uncertainty. ·Imrohoro¼glu,
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·Imrohoro¼glu and Joines (1995) add uncertainty about labor earnings to the
model. All three papers explore the role of social security system on aggregate
variables of the economy and they evaluate impacts of some quantitative scal
policies.
·Imrohoro¼glu and Kitao (2010) allows for endogeneous decisions in both
benet claming and labor force participation and they study how these rene-
ments on the setup a¤ect the impact of a reform in the U.S. economy.
Ventura (1999) explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications
of at tax reform. The novelty in his formulation is the introduction of endo-
geneous labor supply together with progressive forms of taxation.
3 Model
3.1. Demographics
The model economy consists of overlapping generations of nitely lived in-
dividuals who may live through age N, the maximum possible life span. At each
period, a continuum of agents are born. Agents face random survival accord-
ing to an age-to-age survival probabilities { t}
N
t=1, where  t is the probability
of surviving from age t   1 to t, conditional on being survived at age t   1.
The population grows at a constant rate n . The share of age-t individuals in
the population is denoted by t and it is independent of the time. Hence, the
demographic structure of the economy is stable.
3.2. Preferences
At each period, individuals are endowed with one unit of time that can
be used for either leisure or market work. They maximize the expected, dis-
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counted lifetime utility
E[
NX
j=1
j(ji=1 i)u(cj;t; 1  lj;t)]
where  is the subjective discount factor, cj;t and lj;t denote consumption and
labor supply of an age-j individual at time t: The utility function is assumed
to take the form
u(c; l) =
[cv(1  l)(1 v)](1 )
(1  )   Ifl>0g
where v is the coe¢ cient of consumption in the composite good,  is the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion and  is the cost for labor participation.
3.3. Social Security
The government operates a pay-as-you-go pension system similar to the
current Turkish system. It taxes working individualslabor income at a xed
rate, , and provides benets to retirees. Individuals can not begin to receive
retirement benets unless they supply labor for at least Re   1 years, where
Re is the earliest age an individual can retire. From now on, we call Re
as early retirement age. The retirement benet is an increasing function of
individuals past labor earnings, so individuals can increase their retirement
benet by increasing years of work, but not to the point that they supply labor
for more than Rm   1 years; where Rm is the mandatory retirement age1. If
an individual supply labor for Rm   1 years, he will get retired in the next
year for sure. Once an individual gets retired, he cannot get back to work and
supply labor for the rest of his life.
1In the Turkish social security system, there is not a mandatory age requirement to
enforce individuals to retire. However, individuals tend to not supply labor when they get
old. Hence, determining a reasonably high mandatory retirement age doesnt a¤ect the
decisions of individuals but decreases computational burden in a great amount.
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The retirement benet is a weighted sum of individualspast labor earnings.
For an agent who supply labor forR years, whereRe  R  Rm; the retirement
benet is such that
RX
i=1
iw^e(z; i)
bli
where w^e(z; i)bli is the labor earning at period i; which is explained in the next
section in detail. i is the replacement rate of period i. The retirement benet
is xed for an agent through retirement.
3.4. The Individual Constraints
Each period, individuals, who work in previous period and are below
mandatory retirement age, Rm, face a productivity shock, e(z; j), which com-
bines productivity e¤ect of age j with idiosyncratic shock z. The shock z fol-
lows a rst-order Markow process with transition probabilities p(z0; z). Shocks
for age 1 are recieved according to the probability measure q (z) :
Agents in this economy are born with no assets. Let cj;t; lj;t and aj+1;t+1
are consumption, labor and asset choices of individual of an age-j agent. Then
the budget constraint facing an individual can be written as
(1+ c)cj;t+aj+1;t+1  aj;t(1+rt(1  k))+(1 )wte(z; j)lj;t+TRt+ben Tj;t
where aj;t is asset holding at age j and time t, wt is the wage rate and rt
denotes interest rate,  is the social security tax,  c is the consumption tax,
 k is the at capital tax rate, ben is the social security benet which is zero
before the retirement and equal to retirement benet through retirement, TRt
is the lump-sum transfer of accidental bequests and Tj;t is the income tax.
Although agents are assumed to know the survival probabilities, they dont
know the exact time of the death. Therefore, they can leave assets behind
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when they experience early death. We assume that these assets are equally
distributed among all of the survivers in a lump-sum fashion.
Agents are not allowed to borrow, but they are able to accumulate assets
through saving to smooth consumption across time. This constraint can be
stated as
aj;t  0
Agents who can live through N periods, the maximum possible lifespan,
will choose not to carry over any assets to the next period,
aj+1;t+1 = 0 if j = N:
3.5. Fiscal Policy
The government consumes in every period the amount G and nances its
expenditures by taxing consumption, capital and labor earnings. The tax
procedure is applied in a way that mimic the current tax structure in the
Turkey. The at tax rates is used for consumption at rate  c and the capital
(asset) income is taxed through the at capital tax rate  k. On the other hand,
there is a progressive income tax in which tax rate is increasing with respect to
the income level. Let I0; I1; :::; IM be the income thresholds with corresponding
marginal tax rates  1;  2; :::; M : An agents income subject to taxation is its
labor income. Hence, an age-j agent with income I = wte(z; j)lj;t; with I 
(Im 1; Im]; pays the amount
T (I) =  1(I1   I0) +  2(I2   I1) + ::::+ m(Im   Im 1)
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3.6. Technology
The production technology of the economy is given by a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas function
Y = F (K;LX) = AK(LX)(1 )
where A>0,  (0,1) is capitals share of output, K and L are aggregate
capital and labor inputs, respectively. X is the technology level, which grows
at a constant rate g. The aggregate capital stock is assumed to depreciate at
the rate .
3.7. Individuals Problem
We restrict ourselves to a comparison of steady states and do not consider
transiton paths. So, we can dispense with time subscripts on all variables.
Also, for computational purposes we transform the variables so as to remove
the e¤ects of technological growth and population growth. The aggregate
variables G, K and Y , which grow at the steady state due to both population
and technological growth, are detrended from both. Aggregate labor, L, is
detrended from population growth at steady state. Transfers, taxes and bene-
ts are detrended from tecnological growth. The individual variables a, c and
factor price real wage detrended from growth. Hence the transformations are
as follows:
Y^ = Y=(NX); K^ = K=(NX); G^ = G=(NX); L^ = L=N; T R^ = TR=X;
bT = T=X, bben = ben=X; ba = a=X; c^ = c=X; w^ = w=X; l^ = l; r^ = r
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With these transformations, individuals are denoted by a state vector
x = fba; z; j; h; bg;where ba denotes current asset holding , z denotes corre-
sponding idiosyncratic productivity shock, j denotes age, h is an indicator
that takes a value 1 if an individual has already applied for retirement benet
in previous periods and takes a value 2 otherwise, b is the social security ben-
et an individual gets in this period if he has already applied or if he applies
in this period to retirement.
At the beginning of each period, individuals learn their productivity shock
and so their state x, then make an optimal decision of fbc;bl;ba0g;where bc denotes
consumption, bl labor and ba0 asset holding to next period and they decide to
retire if they are allowed to do:The choice is made under uncertainty of survival
to future periods and future productivity shocks. The retirement decision
determines the indicator h0 and labor decision determines retirement benet
b0 for next period. Then, conditional on the survival, at the beginning of next
period with the realization of the productivity shock z0, agents can enter the
next period with new state vector x0 = fba0; z0; j + 1; h0; b0g:
We compute the individualsproblem recursively. Let V (x) be the value
function of an individual in state x is given by
V (x) = max
(bc;bl;ba0;h0)u(bc; 1  l^) +B(1 + g)[v(1 )] j+1E[V (x0)]
subject to
(1+ c)bc+ba0(1+g)  ba(1+r^(1  k))+(1 )w^e(z; j)bl+TR^+bben  bT (w^e(z; j)bl)
bc  0; ba0  0
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b0 = b+ jw^e(z; j)bl)
h0 =
 f1; 2g if h = 2
1 otherwise

bl =  [0; 1] if h0 = 2
0 otherwise

bben = b if h0 = 1
0 otherwise

where T (w^e(z; j)bl) denotes the income tax for given labor income.
3.8. Stationary Equilibrium
In this model, agents are heterogenous at any time with respect to their
productivity shock, asset holdings, age, employment status and past labor
earnings. The concept of equilibrium follows Stokey and Lucas(1989).
Denition: A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of individuals
decision rules {a; c; l; h} for each state x, law of motion of b for each state
x; factor prices {w; r}, government policy variables {G;  k;  c; } and income
tax paid T for each state x, early and mandatory retirement age fRe; Rmg; a
lump sum transfer of accidental bequests TR; aggregate capital K, aggregate
labor L; social security transfers ben for each state x; and the measure of
individuals {(x)} that satisfy the following conditions :
1) Individualsdecision rules solve the recursive optimization problem de-
ned in the previous section.
2) Factor prices are determined competitively, i.e r = F1(K;L)    and
w = F2(K;L):
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3) The capital and labor market clears.
K =
X
x
a(x)(x)=(1 + n)
L =
X
x
we(z; j)l(x)(x)
4) The goods market clears.
C +K 0 +G = F (K;L) + (1  )K;
where C =
X
x
c(x)(x) and K 0 = (1 + g)
X
x
a(x)(x)
5) The lump sum transfer is equal to the amount of assets left behind.
TR =
X
x
a(x)(1 + r)(1   j+1)(x)=(1 + n)
6) Social security systems budget is balanced.
wL =
X
x
ben(x)(x)
7) Government budget constraint is satised.
G = Kr k + C c +
X
x
T (we(z; j)l(x))(x)
8) The measures are consistent with individual behaviour.
For j  1 and for any x0 = fa0; z0; j + 1; h0; b0g and x = fba; z; j;bh;bbg;
(x0) =
X
x: a(x)=a0; h(x)=h0; b(x)=b0
p(z; z0)(x)
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4 Calibration
This section describes the calibration process of the benchmark economy.
The parameters of the bencmark model are determined in order to reect the
situation of Turkish economy for early nineties. The model period is set equal
to one year.
4.1. Demographics
Agents are born at a real-time age 20 and they can live through at max-
imum N=81 periods, up to the real-time age 100. The sequence of survival
probabilities are calculated in a two steps. As a rst step, survival probabili-
ties { t}
50
t=1 are calculated via the projected population estimates by Kocaman
(2002) for years 1995 and 2000. Since the estimates of population are using
5-year cohorts, linear interpolations are used to obtain survival probabilities
for all possible ages. As a second step, due to the absence of population esti-
mates for cohorts at age greater than 70, survival probabilities { t}
81
t=51 are
determined to follow the pattern of initial survival probabilities and to match
the exact population share of older cohorts as a sum in the population of so-
ciety. The population growth, n, is set equal to 0.024 as the average growth
rate of population for the period 1960-1990.
4.2. Preferences
The parameter of risk aversion, , is set equal to 2, which is in line with
the existing literature. According to Turkstat 1994 Household Budget Survey,
individuals, at ages between 20 and 45, devote 49 hours to work in a week, out
of unsleeping time which is 112 hours for a week. The coe¢ cient of consump-
tion in the composite good, , is determined to match the fraction of time
devoted to work.
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The discount factor, , is determined endogenously to match the capital
to output ratio, which is estimated as 2.48 for the period 1972-1992 by Cihan
(2002).
The cost for labor participation, , is determined to match the share of
older cohorts or younger cohorts in work force in the literature. We rather
choose to target the ratio of specic cohorts since the model overestimate the
participation of young generations to workforce and the age of starting work
varies among individuals in real life in contrast to our model economy. The
cost for labor participation is determined endogenously to match the ratio
of individuals at model age between 10 and 20 to individuals at model age
between 30 and 40 in labor force.
4.3. Technology
There seems to be a wide range of estimates for capital share of output,
, in the literature2. Also, TURKSTAT estimates are highly volatile even in
following years3. Therefore, in the absence of a consensus for the parameter, it
should be better to calculate an estimate via the estimates for other countries.
Gollin (2002) estimates an average for highly diversed 32 countries for nineties
and it can be a good measure for Turkey as a developing country, so it is set
equal to 0.528.
Following the Cooley and Prescott methodology, the depreciation rate for
capital is selected in order to match the ratio of total investments to total
capital. Cihan (2002) estimated total investments and total capital for years
between 1972 and 2000. The ratio of total investments to total capital is
2Cihan (2002) estimates capital share of output as 0.53, however Alper (2004) use 0.35.
3Turkstat estimates capital share of output for years 1988, 1991, 1995 and 2001 as 0.63,
0.53, 0.61 and 0.49 respectively.
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calculated as 0.94 for the period 1972-1992, hence depreciation rate, , is set
equal to 0.0436.
The growth rate of technology, g; is set equal to 0.0265 as the average
growth rate of output between 1960-1990.
4.4. Social Security
In the benchmark economy, the replacement rates are such that4
i =
8><>:
0:035 if i  10
0:02 if 10 < i  25
0:01 if i > 25
9>=>;
The social security tax rate, , is set endogenously to exactly balance the
budget of the social security system. In other words, in any period the sum
of deductions from workers labor income is equal to sum of social security
benets of retired individuals.
With the change in the social security law in 1993, women were eligible to
retirement after 20-years of work and men were eligible after 25 years of work.
The early retirement age, Re; is taken to be 24 for the benchmark economy by
taking into account the shares of genders in the labor force5. The mandatory
retirement age, Rm; is set equal to 526.
4These rates are used in Emekli Sand¬¼g¬, a branch of the social security system in Turkey,
until the social security reform in 2008.
5Women compose a slightly more than 30% of labor force as an average for years 1988-
1992.
6Turkstat 2005 Household Budget Survey shows that there is no one in labor force at
age greater than 70. Also, in our simulations with great number of agents, there is no one
supply labor at model age greater than 50. Therefore, setting mandatory retirement age
equal to 52 is not a constraint on agentsdecisions.
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4.5. Taxes and Government Consumption
Consumption tax rate,  c; is set endogenously to match an average value
of the ratio of total tax burden on consumption and services to output, which
is 0.0498 for the period 1992-1995. Similarly, the at capital tax rate,  k;
is chosen endogenously to match the total corporate tax to output, which is
0.0104 for the period 1992-1995.
The taxation of income is more involved as shown in Table 1, where income
bendpoints I0; I1; :::; IM are expressed in multiples of average household labor
income, 7. Average household labor income is determined endogenously in
the model. Marginal tax rates are slightly di¤erent for undeveloped regions
from the tax rates in the table. However, those regions compose less than 10%
of output in Turkey and so it has a negligible e¤ect.
Taxable Income Marginal Tax Rate
0,0.45® 0.25
0.45®,0.9® 0.3
0.9®, 1.8® 0.35
1.8®, 3.6® 0.4
3.6®, 7.2® 0.45
7.2® and over 0.5
Table 1: Income tax schedule in model economies
7The income bendpoints and the average household labor income are taken from Turkstat
Budget Survey for 1994.
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Figure 1: E¢ ciency prole with respect to model age
4.6. Stochastic Structure of Wages
We calibrate the productivity function, e(z; j), under the assumptions that
wages have a stochastic structure and it also follows a regression to the mean
process. Since w is constant at all ages and all states, calibration of the
productivity function is equal to the calibration of wage. Let yj and yj denote
the log market return and the mean log market return of an age-j agent .
Then, the idiosyncratic shock will be z = yj yj and the productivity function
takes the form e(z; j) = e(z+yj):Then, the market return to labor follows the
regression to the mean process for all 1< j  Rm :
yj   yj = (yj 1   yj 1) + "j
with "~N(0; 2") and for j = 1; y1~N(y1; 
2
y1
):
The mean log market returns for each age group are calculated from Turk-
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stat 2005 Household Budget Survey as hourly labor earnings8. Figure 1 shows
average log market returns with respect to age.
Then, we need to select values for remaining parameters of the wage
process, (; 2"; 
2
y1
). In the absence of the data of persistence and magnitude
of shocks to market returns, we calculate a wage Gini coe¢ cient for earners
ages between 20 and 65, which is 0:355 from Turkstat 2005 Household Budget
Survey. We create an articial sample of workers by using mean log market re-
turns and di¤erent values for parameters (; 2"; 
2
y1
). We make a great number
of iterations with great number of workers to match the wage Gini coe¢ cient.
Eventually, we set y = 0:98; 2y1 = 0:16 and 
2
" = 0:02.
We approximate a normally distributed log market return process with a
Markow chain by using Tauchens (1986) procedure. A spread parameter 5 is
used and the shock z takes 21 values that are located evenly in the log scale and
symmetrically around zero , as such -5y1 to 5y1 :Probabilities q(z) of receiving
a particular shock at age 1 are computed directly from normal distribution
N(0; 2y1):The transition probabilities, p(z; z
j); are obtained similarly.
5 Findings
5.1 Benchmark economy
Table 2 shows basic statistics for the benchmark economy. These results
are important so that they are compared with alternative policy in the next
section.
8Linear interpolations are used to obtain average log wages for all possible ages.
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K K/Y Saving
rate
L Mean
hours
Discount
rate
5.8 2.48 %12.67 1.1 0.45 0.996
Soc. sec.
tax rate
w Ave. reti ?
rement age
Participa ?
tion ratio
r Gov. share
in output
%19 1.0 30 0.543 %16.9 0.31
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Benchmark Economy
The social security tax rate is required to be %19 to balance the budget of
social security system in benchmark economy, which seems to be very less than
what we expect. In current Turkish social security system, whole deductions
from labor earnings amount to %33.5 of labor earnings. However, approxi-
mately %25 of these deductions are used for health expenditures, which is not
covered in this model. Also, our model assumes that individuals pay their
social security liabilities at each period regularly. However, in real life the
government cannot collect social security taxes completely. It has declared an
amnesty for who had not paid social security taxes more than ten times in
last twenty years. These tax amnesties include not only reduction in interest
charged for late payment but also reduction in main liabilities of tax pay-
ers. Therefore these decrease the revenues of social security system at a great
amount and the government keeps social security tax higher to compensate
this loss.
Average retirement age is 30 in the benchmark economy which corresponds
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Figure 2: Age-labor supply prole and age-mean hour prole
to age 49 in real life, which is very close to the estimates of Social Pension
Agency for early nineties9.
Figure 2 shows the connection between age and labor earnings, and the
connection between age and mean hours devoted to work. Average labor
earnings rises with age and starts to fall at about average retirement age,
reecting the e¢ ciency prole. The path of mean hours slopes down from the
beginning, the decrease is slow up to the point that e¢ ciency of workers starts
to decline. Then, the decrease is getting faster with decreasing e¢ ciency of
hours supplied to work and thus average labor earnings decreases dramatically
from that point. These proles are plausible. Turkstat household budget
survey in 2005 shows that average labor earnings peaks at ages between 45
and 50, then starts to decline.
9According to Social Pension Agency (SSK) estimates, average retirement age is 50 for
1992, 49 for 1993, 50 for 1994,1995 and 1996.
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5.2 Alternative policy
In the alternative economy, we increase the early retirement age from 24
to 47. Although social security reform in 2008 make a change in the para-
meters of pension system, the replacement rates are left unchanged since we
try to evaluate only the e¤ects of the change in retirement age. Also, as in
the benchmark economy, we balance the budget of social security system and
the budget of government. The social security tax rate is set endogeneously
to balance the budget of social security sytem. We keep consumption and
capital tax rates constant, and endogenously set income tax rates to set the
government share in output equal to the rate found for the bechmark econ-
omy. The demographic structure of the economy is left unchanged. By using
the parameters, found in the calibration of the bencmark economy, we solve
the steady state equilibrium as an alternative policy. Since we assume open
economy, factor prices are same with benchmark economy.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the alternative policy.
K K/Y Saving
rate
L Mean
hours
Discount
rate
10.76 3.05 %15.6 1.21 0.458 0.996
Soc. sec.
tax rate
w Ave. reti ?
rement age
Participa ?
tion ratio
r Gov. share
in output
%4 1.0 46 1 %16.9 0.31
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Economy
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An important nding is that increase in early retirement age has a signif-
icant e¤ect on capital accumulation and labor supply. As shown in table 3,
capital income ratio, net saving rate10, output and aggregate labor increase
substantially with respect to the benchmark economy. For instance, aggregate
capital stock increases by about %85.5, capital income ratio increase by about
%23, net saving rate increases by 2.93 percentage points and labor supply
increases by about %10. The main reason lies behind this nding is agents
are become deprived of great amount of future income with the increase in
early retirement age and they need to save more to compensate this dramatic
decrease in their future income. In the alternative policy, the sum of whole
retirement benets is one fourth of the sum of whole retirement benets in
benchmark economy.
From another perspective, the social security system makes a transfer from
workers to retirees. Since workers tend to save more than retirees and retirees
tend to consume more than workers, social security system makes a negative
e¤ect on aggregate savings and individuals labor supply. The increase in
early retirement age decreases the amount of transfers from worker to retirees
substantially. Therefore, the role of social security system in the economy
diminishes, so its negative e¤ect on savings and labor supply.
Aggregate mean hours stay around the levels previously found for bench-
mark economy and the participation to the work force for individuals between
age 23 and 46 become almost twice of the previous case. This indicates that
the increase in participation rate of individuals between age 23 and 46 to the
workforce is the reason of the increase in aggregate labor supply.
Postponing the early retirement age by 23 years, from model age 24 to 47,
increase average retirement age from 30 to 47. Since the burden of retirement
10Net saving rate is computed as [(1 + n)(1 + g)  1]K=Y:
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benets dramatically decrease and revenues from labor earnings increase, the
social security tax rate to nance the retirement benets substantially de-
creases from %19 to %4. This tax rate seems too low to balance the social
security budget of the government by looking at high decits with high so-
cial security tax rate in current situation despite the reform on social security
system on 2008. However, since the changes in social security system doesnt
a¤ect the current workersretirement situation, the transition from benchmark
economy to alternative economy requires a great amount of time. With the
elimination of current workers from labor force, which is about 46 years, the
economy converges about to the alternative economy.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop an applied general equilibrium model to examine
the actuarial consequences of the social security reform and the main nd-
ings are discussed in the previous section. In this section, we focus on some
extensions of our analysis conducted in this paper.
First, in this paper we restrict ourselves to the e¤ects of reform on some
aggregate variables by comparing steady states. The distributional e¤ects of
this reform are not analyzed, which is an important measure of performance of
the reform. Extension of the model to include cross-sectional distributions of
earnings, income and wealth would shed light on this question. The changes
in earnings gini, wealth gini, income gini and median to mean ratios of income
and wealth would be good indicators of distributional e¤ects of the reform.
Second, medical expenditures are not covered in our present formulation.
Medical expenditures make up considerable part of total expenditures of the
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social security system and with the projected increase in medical spending,
it will play a bigger role on Turkish social security system in near future.
Extending model to cover medical expenditures by giving agents health shocks
in each period makes analysis more realistic and may a¤ect the results in this
paper.
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